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Laws, Enforcement, Legality, and  
Economic Development 
Frank H. Stephen∗ 
Stefan Van Hemmen∗∗  
In recent years there has been an explosion in the number of 
papers published on the relationship between the legal system and the 
process of economic development. A distinctive feature of this 
current interest is that the major contributions to the literature come 
from an economic perspective, which differs from an earlier period of 
interest in law and development that was driven largely by legal 
scholars during the 1960s and 1970s.1 This Article will examine the 
relationship between laws, enforcement, legality, and economic 
development by utilizing a framework developed within the New 
Institutional Economics. 
A major development in economics over the last thirty or so years 
has been the increased attention given to issues of institutional design 
and economic organization. What economists labelled, somewhat 
loosely, “The Theory of the Firm” has been transformed from what 
was really “price theory” to the study of the nature of the firm, and 
what determines the boundary between firms and markets when the 
issue of incomplete contracting plays a central role. This 
development has its origins in Ronald Coase’s seminal paper, The 
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 1. For a discussion of why the initial law and development movement failed, see John H. 
Merryman, Comparative Law and Social Change: On the Origins, Style, Decline and Revival of 
the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457–91 (1977); Richard E. Messick, 
Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues, 14 WORLD BANK RES. 
OBSERVER, 117–36 (1999); David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: 
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, WIS. L. REV. 
1062–1102 (1974). See generally David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in Development 
Assistance: Past, Present, and Future, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 74 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
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Nature of the Firm.2 Coase’s insights lay dormant in economic 
literature for many years until they were taken up by Oliver 
Williamson, who developed what he called “Transaction Cost 
Economics” (“TCE”) through a series of papers and books.3 
Williamson has subsequently used the term “Governance” to cover 
the issues dealt with by this type of analysis. 
Around the same time as Williamson was developing TCE, 
Douglass North was beginning his work on the role of the 
institutional environment in economic growth. Institutional Change 
and American Economic Growth was published in 1971.4 Later, 
North also developed an analysis evaluating the importance of 
institutions for economic growth.5 Prior to both Williamson and 
North, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz had begun writing on the 
economic importance of property rights.6 By the early 1970s, the 
economics of property rights had developed sufficient literature to 
merit a review article in the Journal of Economic Literature.7 
Since the early 1970s, work in these areas of economics has 
grown rapidly and the relationship between them has been developed 
to the extent that it has become reasonable to talk of the New 
Institutional Economics. According to Eirik Furubotn and Rudolf 
Richter8 the term New Institutional Economics (“NIE”) was first used 
by Williamson.9 Exactly what is counted as part of the NIE varies 
 
 2. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 3. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (Free Press 1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC 
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (Free Press 1985); Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional 
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 593 (2000). 
 4. LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971). 
 5. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC 
CHANGE (2005). 
 6. Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965); 
Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1964); 
Harold Demsetz, Towards A Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
 7. Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A 
Survey of Recent Literature, 10 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1137 n.4 (1972).  
 8. EIRIK G. FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC THEORY 
(University of Michigan Press 1997).  
 9. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST 
IMPLICATIONS (Free Press 1975). 
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from author to author. Furubotn and Richter suggest that the NIE can 
be defined to cover transaction cost economics, economics of 
property rights, the positive theory of agency, relational and 
incomplete contract theory, new institutional economic history, new 
institutional political economy, constitutional economics, public 
choice, and economic analysis of the law.10 These authors suggest 
that the last two areas are sufficiently distinctive to be excluded from 
their coverage in NIE.11 However, for present purposes, the former 
consideration is perhaps more important. The phenomena they focus 
upon are certainly relevant to the concerns of new institutionalists. 
The boundaries between such sub-disciplines are purely arbitrary, 
and how we aggregate sub-disciplines may be more related to the 
discourse to which a particular researcher contributes than anything 
more fundamental. However, each discourse has its own internal 
dynamic that shapes the development of its literature and the foci of 
concern in a path-dependent manner. 
Although the law-and-economics movement (“L&E”) has 
developed over the same time period as the NIE, the connections 
between them have been fairly limited. L&E has, to a large extent, 
looked at the internal logic of the law, seeking to discern within its 
evolution an efficiency enhancing dynamic. This approach has been 
described as positive law-and-economics. There has also been the 
development of so-called normative L&E, which argues that 
efficiency should be the goal of the law. Many contributions to this 
literature can be seen more properly as prescriptive: if the objective is 
economic efficiency, what set of legal rules will achieve it? For 
scholars of the NIE, L&E, or more generally the economic analysis 
of the law, may be seen as contributing to a deeper understanding of 
the institutional environment.  
LEVELS OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS 
The concerns of NIE and its interface with L&E can be seen by 
adapting a figure from Williamson as shown in Figure 1.12 The first 
 
 10. FURUBOTN, supra note 8, at 31–33. 
 11. Id. at 33. 
 12. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
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level from Williamson’s analysis depicted in Figure 1 is what he calls 
Embeddedness.13 We might think of this as the “cultural level.” 
Located within this level are “norms, customs, mores, traditions . . .’ 
of a society.14 We think of culture, religion, and informal institutions 
developing at this level. Williamson sees activity at this level as 
being spontaneous and without the calculation that exists at other 
levels.15 It is characterized as the level of embeddedness because its 
content for a particular society changes very slowly. Williamson 
suggests it may take as long as centuries or even millennia.16 
 
FIGURE 1 
Adapted from Williamson (2000) 
 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 593, 597 (2000). 
 13. Id. at 596–98. 
 14. Id. at 596. 
 15. Id. at 597. 
 16. Based on the World Values Survey data on eighty societies, RONALD INGLEHART & 
CHRISTIAN WELZEL, MODERNIZATION, CULTURAL CHANGE, AND DEMOCRACY (2005) describe 
how, even when socioeconomic development has produced fundamental changes in belief 
systems over the last three decades, both religion and colonial past have a long lasting impact 
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The institutions in this first level of social embeddedness are 
assumed in the second level, the Institutional Environment. 
According to Williamson, this level contains the formal rules of 
society, such as constitutions, laws, property rights, and the activities 
of the “executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic functions of 
government.”17 It is the venue for what Williamson calls “first order 
economizing”: the design of institutions to achieve specific ends.18 
However, this economization may take place over many years and be 
subject to the shocks of various political, economic, and other crises. 
It may be thought of as an evolutionary process. Williamson suggests 
that it occurs over periods of decades.19 
Although systematic efforts to codify legal characteristics and to 
measure levels of enforcement are relatively recent, existing evidence 
supports his insight. With the exception of major reform programs 
experienced by former socialist countries, an analysis of financial and 
legal institutions suggests that relevant changes have been rather 
infrequent over the past two or three decades.20 Similarly, when the 
rule of law is considered, few countries show significant changes 
over the last decade.21 
 
 17. Williamson, supra note 12, at 598. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. This can be illustrated by the examination of bankruptcy codes. Simeon Djankov et 
al., Private Credit in 129 Countries, 84 J. FIN. ECON. 299 (2007). According to Djankov et al., 
since 1978, up to ninety-nine countries undertook one or more reforms in their bankruptcy laws. 
Id. at 305. This represents more than seventy-five percent of their sample of 129 countries. Id. 
However, these reforms only affected substantial aspects of the law in twenty-five countries. Id. 
This means that over the last three decades, only one in five countries have introduced 
significant reforms in bankruptcy legislation. 
 21. See Daniel Kaufman et al., Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual 
Governance Indicators 1996–2003, 34 (World Bank Research Policy Working Paper, Working 
Paper No. 4280, 2007). Figure 2, p. 29, which illustrates that, for the period from 1998 until 
2006, only seven countries experienced large improvements in rule of law (Algeria, Georgia, 
Kiribati, Liberia, Tajikistan, Serbia, and Rwanda), whereas six countries suffered significant 
deterioration (Zimbabwe, Venezuela, Argentina, Trinidad and Tobago, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Eritrea). Id. The proportion of countries in the sample for which a significant change is 
observed between these two dates is extremely low: less than seven percent. Fig.2, at 29. Note 
that most of the countries identified as experiencing large changes have suffered severe political 
or economic crisis around or throughout this period (i.e. large improvements are likely to show 
a return to the previous situation). Fig.2, at 29. 
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Significant change in financial legal institutions or the rule of law 
is constrained by the first level of embeddedness. Nevertheless, there 
is a feedback loop to the first level. Experiences of the institutional 
environment may, over long time periods, lead to modification of 
informal institutions and culture which may in time lead to further 
changes of the institutional environment. 
The third level of institutional analysis is described by Williamson 
as the level of Governance.22 He associates this with the “play of the 
game.”23 Within the context set by the Institutional Environment, 
economic activity is shaped by the use of contract and the design of 
organizations. For Williamson, this is the domain of transaction cost 
economics (“TCE”). Transactions differ in characteristics, such as 
frequency and the need for transaction-specific investment, which, 
when combined with the human characteristics of bounded rationality 
and opportunism, leads to a discriminating alignment of transactions 
and means of governing them.24 In particular, Williamson considers 
the choice between market and hierarchy (the choice between 
contracts and organizations) as the means of mediating a 
transaction.25 The TCE theory is usually interpreted as arguing that 
transaction costs are the major determinant of mode of governance. 
However, a close reading of the literature makes it clear that it is the 
sum of transaction costs and production costs that is relevant.  
Another approach to governance has become known as Positive 
Agency Theory. Here, the emphasis is on controlling agency costs. 
Ultimately this approach may be seen as identifying different forms 
of organization as responses to differences in agency costs and the 
means of controlling them over different contexts.26 Williamson 
refers to activity at this level as second order economizing and 
suggests that the time scale for such behaviour is anything from a 
year to a decade.27 Second order economizing is constrained by the 
 
 22. Williamson, supra note 12, at 599. 
 23. Id. at 597 fig.1. 
 24. Id. at 605. 
 25. Id. at 602–03. 
 26. A more detailed comparison of these two approaches is provided by Gérard 
Charreaux. Gérard Charreaux, Positive Agency Theory: Place and Contributions, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF CONTRACTS 251, 259 (Eric Brousseau & Jean-Michel Glachant eds., 2002). 
 27. Williamson, supra note 12, at 599. 
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institutional environment, particularly the distribution of property 
rights and contract laws.28 
The fourth and final level of social analysis identified by 
Williamson is Resource Allocation.29 It is here that economic 
decisions are made within the constraint of a fixed Institutional 
Environment and also of fixed modes of Governance. This is the 
arena of neoclassical economic analysis. Here, economic agents 
allocate resources in response to price signals generated by markets 
for factors of production, governments, and bureaucracies.30 
Williamson describes adjustment at this level as third order 
economizing and taking place “more or less continuously.”31  
This Article is largely concerned with the Institutional 
Environment, which sets the context within which economic agents 
can design governance structures that allocates resources. The 
Institutional Environment is taken to be exogenous to issues of 
governance in the short run. This is indicated in Figure 1 by the solid 
arrows.32 The choice of governance arrangements by participants in a 
particular activity are constrained by the institutional environment.33 
A given institutional environment may preclude the emergence of a 
particular governance structure or may not provide appropriate 
incentives for it to be chosen by agents in the system. This can be 
thought of as a short-run phenomenon, but the short run may be quite 
long in terms of chronological time, perhaps even decades according 
to Williamson.34 In the long run, there may be feedback from the 
realm of Governance to the Institutional Environment, which leads to 
changes in the latter. As a result, the Institutional Environment may 
evolve in response to the feedback to widen the choice of feasible 
governance structures. This may be the case when some aspects of 
the institutional environment cannot be contracted around to fashion 
 
 28. Id. at 598–99. 
 29. Id. at 597. 
 30. Id. at 600. 
 31. However, this instantaneous adjustment presumably incorporates, ceteris paribus, 
what economists designate as the long run, i.e., the period necessary for adjustment in capital 
and technology to take place. Id. at 600. 
 32. Id. at 597 fig.1. 
 33. Williamson, supra note 12, at 596. 
 34. Id. at 597 fig.1. 
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a “desirable” governance structure in some area of economic activity. 
According to Williamson’s scheme, this combination of short-run 
constraints and long-run feedback loops is replicated at each level in 
the hierarchy.35 However, as we move down the levels of analysis, 
the time needed for this feedback loop to occur is apparently reduced. 
LAWS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The issue of growth and institutions has come to prominence in 
academic discourse in recent years. It has also been central to the 
concerns of the World Bank. Recently there have been a number of 
strands in economic research that have related economic growth and 
development to aspects of the institutional environment, both directly 
and indirectly.36 At the most general level Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson have examined the influence of colonial origins and early 
institutions on the level of development in a sample of former 
colonies.37 They argue that colonial origins and the nature of 
colonization are the key determinants of development because they 
heavily influence current institutions.38 In their analysis, current 
institutions are proxied by an index of the risk of appropriation of 
assets by government. Rodrick, Subramanian, and Trebbi test 
competing explanations of development in an extensive econometric 
exercise.39 The competing explanations are those that give the pre-
eminent role of determinants of development to institutions, 
geography, or integration into world trade.40 Their proxy for 
institutions is a “Rule of Law” index.41 They argue that both rule of 
law and trade integration are not independent determinants of growth 
but are, themselves, determined within the system they seek to 
 
 35. Id. at 596. 
 36. This article only provides indicative references from the rapidly growing literatures. 
 37. Daron Acemoglu et al., The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An 
Empirical Investigation, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1369 (2001). 
 38. Id. at 1395–96. The nature of colonization and institutions was, in turn, determined by 
settler mortality rates during the colonization period. 
 39. Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The 
Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, J. ECON. 
GROWTH, June 2004, at 131. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 132. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/4
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model.42 To deal with this, they use the colonial origin variables used 
by Acemoglu43 as the fundamental determinant of institutions.44 They 
conclude that their results show that the main determinant of 
development is institutions.45 
A second strand in the literature relates growth or development to 
the existence of a healthy financial sector, which is in turn a function 
of legal institutions.46 They demonstrate the relationship between 
growth and various measures of the financial sector. Levine extends 
this to show that the measures of financial sector development are 
themselves functions of creditor protection laws, risk of government 
contract modification, and accounting regulations.47 The latter, 
however, are seen primarily as instrumental variables to overcome 
the endogenity of the financial sector variables. Levine extends this 
to an analysis of stock market development and shareholders’ 
rights.48 Azfar and Matheson, as part of a program on market 
augmenting government, develop the concept of “market-mobilized 
capital,” which they claim plays a central role in economic growth.49 
Market-mobilized capital “is the sum of outstanding debt and equity 
relative to GDP.”50 Market mobilized capital is seen as a measure of 
private financial market development which may have a causal 
relationship with a country’s economic performance.51 Again, in 
dealing with issues of endogenity and causality, Azfar and Matheson 
 
 42. Id. at 133. “The extent to which an economy is integrated with the rest of the world 
and the quality of its institutions are both endogenous, shaped potentially not just by each other 
and by geography, but also by income levels.” Id. 
 43. Acemoglu, supra note 37. 
 44. Rodrick et al., supra note 39, at 134–35. 
 45. Id. at 146. 
 46. See Ross Levine, Napoleon, Bourses, and Growth, with a Focus on Latin America, in 
MARKET-AUGMENTING GOVERNMENT: THE INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROSPERITY 49 
(Omar Azfar & Charles A. Cadwell eds., 2003) [hereinafter Levine, Napoleon]; Robert G. King 
& Ross Levine, Finance Entrepreneurship and Growth: Theory and Evidence, 32 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 513 (1993); Ross Levine, Law, Finance and Economic Growth, 8 J. FIN. 
INTERMEDIATION 8 (1999) [hereinafter Levine, Law]; Ross Levine & Sara Zervos, Stock 
Markets, Banks and Economic Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1998). 
 47. Levine, Law, supra note 46. 
 48. Levine, Napoleon, supra note 46. 
 49. Omar Azfar & Thornton Matheson, Market-Mobilized Capital, 117 PUB. CHOICE 357, 
358 (2003). 
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. at 365. 
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use measures of investor protection, creditor protection and 
enforcement of laws as instrumental variables.52 
A third approach is taken by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
and Vishny (“LLSV”),53 who in a series of papers develop measures 
of creditor protection laws, investor protection laws, and law 
enforcement to investigate a variety of issues. In their literature these 
measures are seen as key determinants of the phenomena under 
investigation.54 A major theme of their work is the consistent 
influence of legal families, such as common law, French civil code, 
German civil code, and Scandinavian law, on aspects of the financial 
and corporate systems of countries.55 The investor and creditor 
protection variables developed in this work allow the influence of 
differences in such laws on various aspects of the financial and 
corporate sectors to be analyzed. These papers and subsequent work 
with, inter alia, World Bank staff has had a profound influence on 
policymaking by both multilateral aid agencies and governments in 
developing countries. 
Explicit attention to the operation of the legal system is 
essential to development and poverty reduction through 
liberalization and the market economy. Economic literature 
increasingly recognizes the importance of the rule of law and 
legal systems in the promotion of market-based economic 
growth and poverty reduction. . . . There is also an emerging 
literature on general differences between the economic growth 
of countries from the common law tradition, emanating from 
England, as opposed to the civil law tradition, emanating from 
France. Studies suggest that the countries from the civil law 
tradition may have more difficulties conforming to the market 
based models and standards for economic development. 
Common law systems historically put more faith in the 
autonomy of the judiciary and the law, while civil law states 
 
 52. Id. at 361. 
 53. Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131–50 
(1997).  
 54. Rather than a means of overcoming statistical problems. 
 55. See La Porta et al., supra note 53, at 1131–50; Rafael La Porta et al., Law and 
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113–54 (1998).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/4
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invested more in state control and circumscription of the courts 
and judiciary. It has been argued that it was more difficult to 
create entrepreneurial businesses in civil law countries where 
the state was so involved in the economy. In many countries to 
which civil law was exported, the relatively strong model of 
the state led to a government (and judiciary) dominated by 
leading families who could translate their elite status into 
control of both the state and economy. The greater autonomy 
and role of legal systems in common law countries helped 
produce rules that fostered new entry and investment.56  
The second and third strands of the empirical literature relating 
growth and legal institutions are often grouped together under the 
heading of “Law and Finance.” Elsewhere, we review a large number 
of studies which have used this approach.57 
Literature critical of the legal origin hypothesis has emerged more 
recently. The criticisms encompass the technical issues of variable 
construction and precision,58 the role of statutory law in common law 
countries with respect to investor and creditor protection,59 the extent 
to which the variables are used to measure aspects of the legal system 
rather than the interaction of the legal system with non-legal aspects 
of a particular society,60 and the relationship between legal and 
political systems.  
 
 56. WORLD BANK, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIENCES AND 
APPROACH OF THE LEGAL VICE PRESIDENCY 20 (2002).  
 57. Stefan Van Hemmen & Frank H. Stephen, Rule of Law, Finance and Economic 
Development: Cross-country Evidence, in LAW AND THE STATE: A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
APPROACH 185 (Alain Marciano & Jean-Michael Josselin eds., 2003).  
 58. H. Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s “Anti-
Director Rights Index” under Consistent Coding, Harvard Law School John M. Olin Center 
Discussion paper No. 7, Mar. 2006, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_ 
center/fellows_papers/pdf/Spamann_7.pdf. 
 59. Mark J. Roe, Keynote Lecture at the European Association of Law and Economics 
Annual Conference: Institutional Foundations for Securities Markets in the West (Sept. 19, 
2003), available at http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/frydmanr/Roe-AER2003.doc.  
 60. Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule of Law 
Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141 (2005).  
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ENFORCEMENT AND “LEGALITY” 
An aspect of the institutional environment that was undervalued in 
the early Law and Finance literature is how effectively legal rights 
are enforced. Although the statistical analysis linking development to 
legal rules frequently include “enforcement” as an explanatory 
variable, most of the discussion focuses on the rules rather than 
whether they are enforced or not. Indeed, LLSV argues that the 
degree of “enforcement” is determined by legal origin.61 Others 
dispute this link.62 More importantly, we would argue that regardless 
of statutes’ existence, if they are not enforced or enforced 
unpredictably, they are ultimately ineffective. Effort expended in 
improving the content of the statutory laws of a country may be 
totally wasted if they are not enforced or if their enforcement is too 
costly in terms of time and delay. The impact of legal rules on 
economic development in general and financial development in 
particular may not be independent of how they are enforced. Our own 
statistical analysis63 shows that the impact of investor protection rules 
on the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP is not independent 
from a measure of enforcement of statutes in a country. Using data on 
forty-nine developed and developing countries64 previously analyzed 
by Azfar and Matheson,65 we find that there are nineteen developed 
and middle income countries where the level of enforcement is high 
enough such that stock market capitalization could only be improved 
by improving investor protection laws. There are fourteen countries, 
including developed, developing, and middle income countries, 
where improvements in enforcement as well as investor protection 
rules would increase stock market capitalization. However, for five 
developing countries, from a sample of fourteen countries, increasing 
investor protection would not improve stock market capitalization. 
 
 61. La Porta, supra note 53, at 1139–46. 
 62. Berkowitz et al., infra note 78, at 174–75. 
 63. Frank H. Stephen & Stefan Van Hemmen, Market Mobilized Capital, Legal Rules and 
Enforcement, Discussion Paper in Economics No. 04-03, University of Strathclyde, Glascow 
(2004), available at http://www.economics.strath.ac.uk/Research/Discussion_papers/discussion 
_papers.html.  
 64. Data does not include transition countries. 
 65. Azfar & Matheson, supra note 49, at 362–69. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/4
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An increase in stock market capitalization in those five countries 
could only be achieved through improving the enforcement of laws.66 
The process of identifying economic development with the reform 
of legal systems has continued through, inter alia, the World Bank’s 
Doing Business project.67 However, the Doing Business project is 
specifically concerned with the costs in the time and effort of 
enforcing legal rights rather than the content of the legal rights. When 
combined with the enumeration of the rights themselves, this work 
can be interpreted from a NIE perspective as an attempt to map 
across a large number of countries68 major elements of their 
institutional environment. The Doing Business project does this with 
the intention of encouraging reform and adaptation in a way that will 
increase the effectiveness of the legal system in promoting economic 
growth and development.  
The high costs of enforcement are clearly a transaction cost from a 
NIE perspective.69 What creates them? At one level it is tempting to 
say that enforcement, as we measure it, is higher in developed 
countries than in developing countries. There is indeed a high and 
statistically significant correlation between measures of enforcement 
and income per capita.70 However, since the institutional approach 
seeks to explain the level of development in terms of the institutional 
environment, this does not significantly further the analysis. A more 
fundamental explanation of differences in the effectiveness of legal 
systems is required.  
In discussing the mixed record of countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe in making the transition from socialism to capitalism, 
Pejovich argues that differences in culture provide the explanation.71 
It should be noted that most transition countries have adopted laws 
from other jurisdictions to provide the legal protection normally 
 
 66. The forty-ninth country (Hong Khong) had the maximum score on the investor 
protection variable and a sufficiently high level of enforcement that no improvement in 
enforcement would increase stock market capitalization. 
 67. Doing Business, http://www.doingbusiness.org (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
 68. In the 2007 version of the Doing Business data base, there are 175 countries. 
 69. Svetozar (Steve) Pejovich, Understanding the Transaction Costs of Transition: It’s 
the Culture, Stupid, 16 REV. AUSTRIAN ECON. 347, 348 (2003). 
 70. See La Porta et al., supra note 53; Berkowitz et al., infra note 78, at 174–75. 
 71. Pejovich, supra note 69, at 348. 
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associated with market economies.72 However, the effectiveness of 
transition country legal systems, in many cases, is relatively poor.73 
The transplanted legal rules may be seen as being incompatible with 
the culture and social norms of these transition countries. 
Consequently, the transaction costs of using the legal system rise 
dramatically. Pejovich posits the view that the cultures of most 
Central and East European countries embody norms of collectivism, 
egalitarianism, extended family, and shared values.74 He contrasts 
this with the culture of capitalism, which he suggests embraces 
individualism, self-interest, self-determination, self-responsibility, 
risk-taking, and open market competition.75 The transition process in 
his view requires a cultural transformation rather than a legal one.76 
This, as Williamson’s characterization of embeddedness suggests, is 
a much longer process than that of changing legal codes. As Pejovich 
puts it, formal rules are policy variables while informal rules are 
not.77 In NIE terminology, the institutional environment imposed by 
the transition process is incompatible with the norms and informal 
rules that are embedded in these societies. 
From a legal perspective, the transition process in Central and 
Eastern Europe is an example of the more general process of legal 
transplantation. Legal rules and codes have been transplanted from 
one society to another since antiquity. The transplantation may arise 
from conquest and colonization, through emulation and adaptation, or 
as a condition of development aid by an international donor agency. 
Some authors have sought to link the poor performance of a 
country’s legal systems to the process by which it was acquired. 
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard classify countries as being receptive 
or unreceptive to legal transplants.78 In receptive countries, laws are 
being transplanted because there is a perceived need by legal actors 
in that country for new laws. These new laws have been adapted to 
 
 72. Pistor et al., infra note 83, at 346. 
 73. See Pistor et al., infra note 83. 
 74. Pejovich, supra note 69, at 351. 
 75. Id. at 350. 
 76. Id. at 348, 358. 
 77. Id. at 348. 
 78. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the Transplant Effect, 
47 EUROPEAN ECON. REV. 165, 174 (2003). 
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suit local conditions or legal actors are sufficiently familiar with the 
basic principles of the legal system from which they are being 
transplanted to facilitate easy adoption.79 In other words, receptive 
transplant countries are those where there is an effective demand for 
the transplant. Unreceptive countries are those where, in effect, 
transplanted laws are supply driven. Therefore, a legal system 
imposed on colonies by a conquering colonial power may not be 
suited to local conditions or be adapted appropriately over time. 
However, where colonization has taken place through settlement, 
rather than conquest, the settling population will bring with them a 
familiar legal system that they are likely to adapt over time to suit 
their needs. 
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard tested their theory with data from 
the forty-nine countries analyzed by LLSV.80 These include ten legal 
origin countries and thirty-seven recipients of legal transplants. The 
authors allocated the thirty-seven countries into receptive and 
unreceptive categories on the basis of their legal histories and 
developed an index of “legality” that measures enforcement and 
effectiveness of a legal system.81 They found that “legality” is lower 
for unreceptive transplants and for French civil law countries, and 
that the influence of the legal system on income per person is through 
“legality.”82 In other words, the effectiveness of the legal system’s 
operation is more important for economic development than the 
content of the law itself.  
Further research on transition countries confirms the importance 
of the transplant effect. Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer analyzed data on 
investor and creditor protection for a number of transition countries 
in 1992 and 1998 and showed that on average, the countries had 
improved over the six year period.83 Indeed the average rating for 
creditor protection in 1998 was higher than the average for any of the 
comparator groups of countries, including common law countries, 
while the rating for investor protection was higher than all 
 
 79. Id. at 174–80. 
 80. Berkowitz et al., supra note 78; La Porta et al., supra note 53. 
 81. Berkowitz et al., supra note 78. 
 82. Id. at 183–85. 
 83. Katharina M. Pistor et al., Law and Finance in Transition Economies, 8 ECON. OF 
TRANSITION 325 (2000). 
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comparator groups other than common law countries.84 However, 
these transition countries did not perform well on a range of measures 
evaluating the effectiveness of the legal system and the rule of law.85 
The authors demonstrate that for these countries, there is a strong 
correlation between legal effectiveness and the transplant status of 
the countries. Unreceptive transplants have lower legal 
effectiveness.86 They then show that, statistically, legal effectiveness 
has a stronger influence in determining the size of financial markets 
than the content of the law with respect to creditor and investor 
protection.87 
Among the recent efforts to link cultural and legal institutions, 
Licht, Goldsmith, and Schwartz find that cultural values, such as 
uncertainty, avoidance, or harmony are negatively associated with 
statutory laws that encourage the resolution of corporate governance 
disputes through confrontational litigation processes.88 They conclude 
that, “in the long term, formal institutions should be consistent with 
the informal cultural environment.”89 One implication of this data is 
that policymakers should consider cultural contexts before designing 
reforms or transplanting legal rules. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This Article has analyzed the role of law and the legal system in 
the process of economic development. We have used a model of four 
levels of social analysis developed by Oliver Williamson to organize 
our analysis. The effectiveness of the legal system in enforcing rights, 
we have argued, is equally if not more important, than the fine detail 
of the law itself for many developing countries, and transplanting 
legal rules from one legal system to another requires legal actors in 
 
 84. Id. at tbl.4, p. 340 and tbl.2, p. 337. 
 85. Id. at 341–48. 
 86. Id. at 348. 
 87. Id. at 356. 
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 89. Id. at 250. 
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the recipient jurisdictions to have an effective demand for the 
transplant. 
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